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INTRODUCTION

No one has thought about the role of the general counsel
more deeply than Geoff Hazard. The role of a lawyer in an
organization raises fundamental questions about both the role of
the lawyer as well as the key and contested question of “Who is
∗ Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law and Co-Director of the
Institute for Law & Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Author was a
speaker at the Thirteenth Annual Houston Law Review Frankel Lecture on November 7,
2008, where he presented an initial version of this Commentary.
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the client?” In his article Legal and Managerial “Cultures” in
Corporate Representation, Geoff pushes the analysis forward by
introducing “culture” into the analysis and by urging us to look to
the sociological literature to better understand the role of a
general counsel in a corporation.1
The most important move in Geoff’s turn to the sociological
literature, I submit, is to push us to examine closely the
organizational context in which lawyers interact with their
management colleagues. By invoking the concept of “culture,”
what Geoff ultimately forces us to do is to recognize: (1) that
organizations are heterogeneous; (2) that broad principles (e.g.,
“independent professional judgment,” “the client is the corporate
juridical entity”) are only given substance in concrete contexts;
and (3) that much of the real work of understanding the role of
lawyers in organizations can only be done at the level of specific
organizations with distinctive organizational cultures.
In this brief response, I want to extend Geoff’s analysis into
a context that he does not address in his article and to begin to
think through how it might help us understand the role of the
lawyer in a somewhat different organizational context: the
nonprofit corporation. Indeed, because this is too broad and
heterogeneous a category to be useful, let me make it even more
specific: the role of the general counsel in a university.
These are preliminary and rather uninformed comments—
more questions than answers. I should emphasize that I have
never worked as a lawyer for a university, have never
represented a university, and have never worked as in-house
counsel for a for-profit corporation either. Instead, I come to this
question with a background in corporate law (which I’ve taught
for the last twenty years), and as one who has, of late, become
interested in and started teaching about nonprofit organizations.
I have also been a member of a university for the past twenty
years and thus have a native’s understanding—and inevitable
misunderstanding—of one university.
II. BACKGROUND
Let me start with some basic building blocks. First, what is
the difference between a for-profit and a nonprofit corporation
such as a university? The key difference from which all sorts of
other differences flow is the “nondistribution constraint.” Unlike
a for-profit corporation, which may distribute excess cash flows to
1. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal and Managerial “Cultures” in Corporate
Representation, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
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its shareholders by paying dividends, buying back shares, or
liquidating, a nonprofit corporation is prohibited from making
distributions.
This nondistribution constraint has two immediate
consequences. First, it means that there are no shareholders to
elect directors, to buy new shares to finance new projects, to sell
their shares and thereby sell control, to approve or veto major
decisions, or to sue faithless fiduciaries. Second, and related, the
complicated question in corporate law of “for whom is the
corporation managed?” instantly becomes even more difficult and
contested. For whom is a university managed? Consider briefly
some of the implications of these features.
In the for-profit corporation, the roles played by
shareholders mean that, as a theoretical and practical matter,
the corporation will ultimately be managed for the shareholders.
Great discretion is given to the managers in how they maximize
shareholder value and even, in the short term, whether they
maximize
shareholder
value.
However,
because
only
shareholders vote for directors, directors ultimately work for
shareholders or else they are displaced. This power, though
rarely exercised, means that the working answer to the question
“For whom is the corporation managed?” is “ultimately, the
shareholders.”
Let us now turn to the parallel question, “For whom is the
nonprofit corporation managed?” or more precisely, “For whom is
the university managed?” Is there any group connected to a
university that serves the same role as the shareholders of a forprofit firm?
III. THE UNIVERSITY:
A HIGHLY STYLIZED AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNT
Consider the modern American university. Because it is
subject to the nondistribution constraint, there are obviously no
shareholders. But now think about the implications of this simple
difference. First, how is the university to gather the “locked-in”
capital to fund its operations? The sources of funds for a
university are tuition, government grants, and donations. Tuition
is largely “fee for service.” It is a payment in exchange for one of
the products that the university produces, namely, education.
Government grants often fund particular activities such as basic
research. Donations to the university constitute the principal
source of what the for-profit world considers “equity capital,” and
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for American universities, these gifts overwhelmingly come from
alumni.2
How do we convince alumni to donate the large sums that
they do? It is obviously a complex process, but one essential
factor is that donors feel a sense of identification with the
university. For the largest givers, this sometimes includes
membership on the university’s board of trustees. But, as with
other nonprofits, big donors often wish to serve on the board
without bearing significant fiduciary responsibilities. Here we
see a second huge difference between for-profits and universities:
the roles of their boards of directors, including the identity of the
directors and their understanding of what they are supposed to
be doing, are fundamentally different. University boards
generally are far larger than boards of publicly held companies,
and the tasks performed by each vary greatly.
In light of the alumni’s role in providing the “equity capital”
of the university, and their domination of the board of directors,
would it be descriptively accurate to say that the university is
managed for the alumni? Not in any robust sense. While it is true
that alumni are “residual beneficiaries” in a certain sense—the
current “value” of their degrees depends in part on the current
success of the university—they have minimal control rights, little
ability to intervene, and limited knowledge about what is going
on. Indeed, the difficulties with thinking of alumni as parallel to
shareholders are illustrated by the problems that universities
like Dartmouth, which give the broad mass of alumni important
roles in electing directors, encounter when they seek to change
the direction of the university.
Would it be descriptively accurate to say that the university
is run for the students? Again, while it is clear that students are
important “stakeholders” in the university, there are vast areas
of university activities that do not relate directly to teaching
students. In particular, students have often complained that the
focus on research—both in allocating resources as well as in
selecting and tenuring faculty—is inconsistent with the teaching
mission (at least until the students graduate and instantly
become more interested in high profile, famous faculty than in
how well they teach!).
Other nonprofit institutions face a similar question when
they determine for whom their organization is operated. My
2. See R.G. Ehrenberg & C.L. Smith, The Sources and Uses of Annual Giving at
Selective Private Research Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges, 22 ECON. EDUC. REV.
223, 224–27 (2003) (showing that alumni have consistently donated more than other
individuals, foundations, and corporations).
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colleague Michael Fitts and I taught a seminar together on
nonprofits this year. Ralph Muller, who runs the University of
Pennsylvania Health System, came to talk to the class about
managing a health care nonprofit. Muller took a health system
that was losing hundreds of millions of dollars and turned it into
one that is making hundreds of millions of dollars. What is his
goal? How does he answer the question “For whom is the health
system managed?”
He sees himself as seeking to make the health system the
best academic medical center it can be in teaching and research,
as measured by the aspirations of his faculty and faculty
members at other universities whom they would like to recruit.
As it happens, top medical researchers like to perform
complicated procedures: the more complicated the better.
Fortunately, those are areas in which Penn can achieve a degree
of market power, thereby allowing it to charge high prices and to
use the profits to subsidize research or obstetric care, for
instance. Why acquire Pennsylvania Hospital and build it into
the largest provider of obstetric care in Philadelphia (delivering
40% of the babies born in Philadelphia) when you lose money on
every baby you deliver? Simply put, Penn cannot train doctors
without teaching them how to deliver babies.
Defining the mission in this way has content. The goal is not
to maximize profits. Were that his goal, he could make even more
money for the university by buying some additional hospitals.
The goal is also not maximizing the delivery of charity care,
although substantial charity care is provided. Nonprofit does not
mean nice.
One of the things that corporate law teaches is that while
the corporation may be managed for the benefit of the
shareholders, that does not mean it is managed by the
shareholders themselves. Systems differ in how they structure
the relationship between the shareholders and the board of
directors. In the nonprofit context, things are even more
complicated: the administrative hierarchy of the typical
university does not, in reality, reflect who calls the shots.
Although the board of trustees—nominally the legal source of all
power—may have significant input into matters such as
endowment investment policy, the overall budget, and in some
cases, the hiring and firing of the university president, most of
the critical decisions in the university are inevitably made by the
tenured faculty who are beyond the reach of both the

Do Not Delete

22

3/28/2009 10:29 AM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[46:1

administrators and the board of trustees.3 Even worse from a
management perspective is that the content of the maximand (to
maximize the excellence of the teaching and research mission of
the university) will be deeply contested by the different interest
groups within the university. A management structure in which
the top of the hierarchy cannot, even in principle, redirect the
course of the firm is, to corporate law eyes, a very odd one
indeed.4
IV. SO WHAT’S A GENERAL COUNSEL TO DO?
So far, I’ve been talking at a pretty general level, a level at
which both Geoff and I agree not much progress can be made. To
give the discussion some content, I’d like to consider some
challenges that the general counsel at Penn—who has varied
over the years—has confronted. In each case, I know about the
issue but complacently retain a tenured faculty member’s perfect
ignorance of the actual facts. I also know nothing about how
these issues were in fact handled by the general counsels who
were stuck with the responsibility. These cases are better
thought of as law school hypos based loosely on real world events.
3. See José A. Cabranes, Myth and Reality of University Trusteeship in the PostEnron Era, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 960–61 (2007) (“Regardless of the role of the
trustees as legal representatives of the university in its dealings with external forces, it is
still the faculty that actually governs.”).
4. This fundamental ambiguity is nicely captured by a long time University
general counsel:
What we have in a college or a university is a perpetual corporate entity
with a sublime mission transcending its managers and its current constituency;
a sublime cause in a corporate form. Unlike the case with most corporations,
there is a duality between management of the corporation and stewardship over
the cause. To manage the university corporation is not to manage its essential
subject matter, which is knowledge and our cultural traditions. This is different
from the business corporation selling products or services for a profit, where the
products and the services and the profits are all within the ambit of corporate
management. The very essence of a business corporation is managed by its board
members and officers; the essence of the university is not.
The board members and administrators of a university have all the powers
over the formal corporate entity that the directors and officers of a business
corporation have, and are viewed by the state and the legal system as managers
of the entity; but as to the very essence of the entity, they are not managers at
all. They are facilitators. This duality provides fertile ground for ambiguity . . . .
....
When college presidents say the faculty are the college; [and] when the
faculty say they do not manage the institution at all . . . there is more ambiguity
than I can eliminate in forty-five minutes or in a career. Yet I think the duality
of essential mission on the one hand, and corporate management designed to
facilitate that mission on the other, is useful to keep in mind.
John A. Beach, The Management and Governance of Academic Institutions, 12 J.C. & U.L.
301, 326–27 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
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I should also add that there are large aspects of the university
counsel’s role that are not captured by these hypos. University
lawyers worry about an incredible range of legal matters
including employment matters, licensing agreements, landlord–
tenant issues, liquor licenses, hotels, concert halls and theaters,
health care providers on a huge scale, and so forth. I have very
few answers about what the general counsel of a university
should do, but I feel a great deal of sympathy for the incredible
difficulty of the position. These perhaps idiosyncratic examples,
however, present some of the problems raised by the essential
contestability of the core mission.
A. Two Contrasting Cases: Water Buffalo and High Rise Sex
Let me start with a pair of contrasting cases involving
student misconduct.
Hypo 1: Water Buffalo
Late one night in January 1993, a student, annoyed by noise
from the dispersal of a sorority party, yelled from his window,
“Shut up, you water buffaloes!” The sorority sisters were AfricanAmerican. The shouting student was white. The sorority sisters
filed a complaint with the university’s disciplinary body alleging
a violation of the university’s racial harassment policy, which
prohibited the use of racial epithets, even though no one could
find any evidence that the term “water buffalo” had ever been
used in that manner. From these rather pedestrian facts arose a
public storm that made its way into the Wall Street Journal and
ultimately into the confirmation hearings of Sheldon Hackney,
Penn’s then-president, who was nominated to head the National
Endowment of the Humanities.5 Once the sorority sisters filed a
complaint, the procedure took on a life of its own. The judicial
inquiry officer investigated the incident, pursued the case, and
offered a settlement to the student, which he rejected. The
matter lingered for months and became “Exhibit A” in the culture
wars of political correctness run wild.6

5. See Editorial, Buffaloed at Penn, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1993, at A12 (noting the
absurdity of the racial harassment allegations).
6. For a further account of the incident, see Alissa Kaye, Controversial ‘Water
Buffalo’ Case Continues, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, May 14, 1993, available at
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/1993/05/14/Resources/
Graduation.Controversial.water.Buffalo.Case.Continues-2188649.shtml.
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Hypo 2: High Rise Sex
One afternoon in September 2005, a student couple had a
sexual encounter. For reasons that were never fully explained,
they ended up having sex against the window of his or her room
in “High Rise North,” a multi-story dorm at Penn with very large
windows. As one might imagine, a crowd gathered and, in this
age of digital photography, some pictures were taken. Some of
those pictures ended up on the personal website of one of the
onlookers and thus became available to the whole World Wide
Web. The girl in the picture soon thought better of things and
complained to the university’s Office of Student Conduct (OSC),
which charged the photographer–poster with violating the
university’s code of student conduct, sexual harassment policy,
and policy on acceptable uses of electronic resources.7 According
to press reports, the charge stated that the student “posted
naked pictures of another University of Pennsylvania student on
[his] personal Web site through the University’s servers, without
that student’s authorization and in a manner highly invasive of
the student’s privacy.”8 According to the memo, the posting
caused one of the pictured students “serious distress” and created
“an intimidating living environment for her.” The OSC proposal
called for the photographer to be placed on disciplinary probation
until graduation and required that he write an essay “discussing
what was wrong with the conduct [he was] involved in” and a
letter of apology. The student rejected the OSC’s proposed
resolution and asked for a disciplinary hearing. Within days of
the story becoming public, however, the university decided to
drop all disciplinary charges.9 Within a week, the incident, which
was beginning to attract national attention, was largely
forgotten.
In these two contrasting cases, we see one of the most
difficult aspects of a university general counsel’s job: reconciling
the university’s internal procedures, administered by deeply
committed employees, with the university’s long term goals. In
“Water Buffalo,” the president took the public position that those
procedures had to take their course and that there was nothing

7. Jason Schwartz, Racy Photo Lands Student in Trouble, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN,
Nov. 30, 2005, available at http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/
paper882/news/2005/11/30/News/Racy-Photo.Lands.Student.In.Trouble-2146436.shtml.
8. Id.
9. Jason Schwartz, University Drops All Charges Against Photographer, DAILY
PENNSYLVANIAN, Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/
media/storage/paper882/news/2005/12/01/BreakingNews/University.Drops.All.Charges.
Against.Photographer-2146464.shtml.
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he could do to bring matters to a swift conclusion. The result was
a personal and public relations disaster for everyone involved:
the university, the president, and the individual students. In
retrospect, it would have been far better for everyone involved if
someone—the general counsel, the provost, the president—had
made the issue “go away” at the beginning. “High Rise Sex,” as
salacious as it was for a few days, quickly disappeared.
But—and here’s the challenge—when a university has
procedures in place, making an incident disappear in the
interests of all (or most) of those involved is a delicate and
difficult mission that requires a combination of insight,
diplomacy, and tact. While there are obviously parallels in the
for-profit world, the differences in context show the unique
nature of the challenges faced by universities. At Penn, I have no
doubt that the institutional memory of the “Water Buffalo”
incident made it easier to get rid of the “High Rise Sex” matter.
B. The Solomon Amendment
Next, consider the problems raised when traditional notions
of academic autonomy clash with governmental directives. The
University of Pennsylvania Law School prohibits employers who
discriminate from using its placement facilities:
The University of Pennsylvania and its Law School do not
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, religion, color, national or ethnic origin,
age, disability, or status as a Vietnam Era Veteran or
disabled veteran. Employers utilizing our Career Planning
facilities will be held to the same standard of non10
discrimination.
Many universities have taken the position that the military’s
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy impermissibly discriminates on the
basis of sexual orientation. As a result, many of those
universities, including Penn, banned the military from using
campus career planning facilities. In 1996, to counteract this
trend, Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment, which
withheld all federal funding for any university that, in the
determination of the Secretary of Defense, has:
[A] policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that
either prohibits, or in effect prevents . . . the Secretary of a
military department or Secretary of Homeland Security
from gaining access to campuses, or access to students (who

10. Univ. of Pa. Law School, On-Campus Recruiting, http://www.law.upenn.edu/cpp/
employer/recruiting/oncampus/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
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are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of
military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in
quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students
11
that is provided to any other employer . . . .

Because large research universities like Penn receive huge
amounts of federal money for research, student aid, and other
purposes, the university took the position that, as much as it
condemned the congressional policy, it would comply. Indeed,
“the University President ordered the Law School not to enforce
12
its antidiscrimination policy against military recruiters.”
Although members of the law faculty believed that the
Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional, the university did
not want to challenge it. Frustrated with the university’s
unwillingness to mount a constitutional challenge, members of
the law faculty, along with some students, brought a declaratory
judgment action alleging that the university’s preexisting policies
complied with the requirements of the Solomon Amendment
because they allowed military recruiters alternative and
13
arguably equivalent access to students. Ultimately, of course,
the Supreme Court upheld the Solomon Amendment.14
My interest in this regard is not the constitutional question
but rather the legal issue of standing and the parallel
institutional questions. Imagine for a moment some regulation
impinging on General Motors (GM), a regulation that the people
who worked at Chevrolet thought outrageous. GM managers,
including the general counsel, decide for a variety of reasons that
GM will not challenge the regulation. Is it even conceivable that
Chevy would challenge it independently? Or that some of the top
managers at Chevy would decide to challenge it in their quasiindividual capacity? Of course not. But the nature of a university,
in which the faculty and the students both have some grounds for
believing that they are the university (and the peculiar
stubbornness and creativity of law professors), makes such a
scenario much less surprising. But how then does a general
counsel chart the legal strategy of the university when there are
all these law professors who think they know better and are

11. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2006).
12. Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. Civ.A. 03-5497, 2004 WL 1925532, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 26, 2004).
13. Id. at *1–2.
14. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60, 70
(2006) (ruling that the Solomon Amendment was constitutional because it did not violate
a law school’s freedom of speech or association).
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willing to spend hours arguing or even litigating their position? It
boggles my corporate lawyer’s mind.
C. Adelphi and Reporting Up the Ladder
My final example is a less amusing one and brings us back to
some of the core themes of Geoff Hazard’s paper. Adelphi
University is located on Long Island, New York. Peter
Diamandopoulos became its president in 1985. He had ambitious
plans for the university. However, by 1995, he had lost the
support of all of the constituencies in the university except for
the board of trustees. The New York Board of Regents, an
independent body appointed by the state legislature, has power
to remove trustees for “neglect of duty.” Responding to
newspaper accounts revealing that Diamandopoulos was the
second highest paid college president in the country, the Board of
Regents investigated and, after uncovering a combination of
incompetence, neglect of duty, and conflicts of interest, replaced
eighteen of the Adelphi University trustees.15
I have no idea whether Adelphi had a general counsel or
what he or she did or did not do. My interest in this case is
different: when you have a governing board that does not
govern—as is the case in most nonprofit corporations—what
happens to the concept of “reporting up”?
Under Rule 1.13(b) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer,
employee or other person associated with the organization
is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a
legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law
that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and
that is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless
the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in
the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer
shall refer the matter to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances,
to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
16
organization as determined by applicable law.

15. Bruce Lambert, New York Regents Oust 18 Trustees from Adelphi U., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at A1.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2008).

Do Not Delete

28

3/28/2009 10:29 AM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[46:1

As noted above, under applicable nonprofit corporate law,
the “highest authority” that can act on behalf of a nonprofit
corporation is its board of directors. The problem, of course, is
that the board of directors of most nonprofit corporations is
uninvolved. When, as anticipated under Rule 1.13, the lawyer
believes that, say, the president is engaging in conduct that
violates a legal obligation to the organization, what should the
lawyer do? Although the comments to Rule 1.13 address
differences between the roles of government lawyers and lawyers
in private organizations, no attention is paid to the nonprofit
sector.17
Rule 1.13 is but one development in the evolution of the role
of lawyers for organizations. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act
implements most of Rule 1.13 in the public company context and
mandates an effective “reporting up” process in which counsel
must:
[R]eport evidence of a material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company
or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof);
and . . . if the counsel or officer does not appropriately
respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary,
appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to
the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence
to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer
or to another committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the
18
issuer, or to the board of directors.
This has given rise to the concept of a qualified legal
compliance committee (QLCC). As the statutory provision
indicates, this may normally be the audit committee but need not
be.19 Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act does not apply to
nonprofit corporations, the standards of governance established
in it have become a source of wisdom for better-counseled
nonprofits. Who was the QLCC at Adelphi? Who is the QLCC at
Penn? Here, of course, we return to the question with which I

17. For a valuable discussion of reporting up in the nonprofit corporation, see
generally Michael W. Peregrine, James R. Schwartz & William W. Horton, ‘Up the
Ladder’ Counsel Reporting Processes for the Nonpublic/Nonprofit Corporation, 2 CORP.
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 423 (2004).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). This section of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act is implemented
in 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2008).
19. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (2008) (providing that the QLCC may consist of a
member of an equivalent committee of independent directors if the issuer lacks an audit
committee).
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started: the governance of the nonprofit. For all of the complexity
or even incoherence of university governance, and for all of the
ambiguity of the role of the university’s board of trustees, at a
minimum, a university board of trustees should have an audit
committee that can play the role of a higher authority, a role that
should be broadcast widely to all members of the university
community.
What does my university do in this regard? Having no first
hand experience, I went online to see what I could find out. There
is, of course, a webpage devoted to the board of trustees in which
we are told that:
Formal
institutional
governance
and
fiduciary
responsibility for the University of Pennsylvania rest solely
with its Board of Trustees. The trustees delegate the
responsibility for the day-to-day management of the
University of Pennsylvania to the administration and, in
particular, to the president. For this reason, one of the most
important responsibilities of the trustees is the selection,
retention, and replacement of the president. The trustees,
however, seek to support and reinforce the administration
in several ways. They serve as a bridge between the
University and the world; on the one hand, interpreting the
institution to the public, and on the other hand, bringing in
experience and perceptions gained outside the University.
The trustees provide leadership in the identification and
development of financial resources. They oversee the
University’s relations with other institutions, the private
sector, government bodies, and the media. In consultation
with the president, the trustees determine the long-range
allocation of resources, making decisions in the context of
the needs and expectations of the University’s
constituencies and of society.
The primary work of the trustees is carried out by eleven
committees: Academic Policy, Audit and Compliance,
Budget and Finance, Compensation, Development, External
Affairs, Facilities and Campus Planning, Honorary Degrees
and Awards, Neighborhood Initiatives, Nominating, and
Student Life. An Executive Committee is empowered to act
on behalf of the trustees between meetings of the full board,
20
which are held in the winter, spring and fall.
This is nice, as far as it goes. By clicking on the tab for “The
Trustees,” one can find out who they are. It turns out that there
are some fifty-eight very eminent men and women who serve as
20. Univ. of Pa., Board of Trustees, http://www.upenn.edu/secretary/trustees/
index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
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trustees. But who serves on the key committees? Who is on the
audit and compliance committee? The executive committee?
There are no tabs for individual committees and no easy way (at
least for me) to find out who is on which committee. By contrast,
of course, one need only look at Goldman Sachs’ “investors”
webpage to find out who is on which committee, including the
identity of the chair.21
V. CONCLUSION
What can we learn from this? There are, it seems to me, a
number of lessons. First, because the very mission of nonprofits
is contested and can be captured by different stakeholders,
individual nonprofits will have very different organizational
cultures. The crazy peculiarities of universities are almost a
parody of this point. How lawyers function within these cultures
will thus be quite specific to their organizations.
Second, the actual distribution of authority and
responsibility within an organization—what procedures are in
place, who runs those procedures, who has the critical
information, and who makes the critical judgments—will
determine the lawyer’s actual role.
Third, for all of the uniqueness and contestability of
nonprofit organizations, legal structure still matters. The history
of the last 50 years of corporate law is the story of putting new
wine in old bottles. In the 1960s, it was recognized that the board
of directors of a modern publicly traded corporation cannot
manage the firm and any normative expectation that the
“business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or
under the direction of its board of directors” would be
22
disappointed. So, instead of expecting the board to manage, new
tasks were invented for the institution, giving birth to the
“monitoring board.” The monitoring board developed over time:
beginning with the SEC studies in the 1960s, continuing with
scholarly writing, finding acceptance—and controversy—in the
ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance, and culminating in
Sarbanes–Oxley and the stock exchange reforms it mandates.
Now, it is the accepted understanding of what the board of
directors is supposed to do.
21. See Goldman Sachs, Investors, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/
investors/corporate-governance/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
22. LITIGATION ISSUES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 416 (William G. Horton & Gerhard Wegen eds., 1997) (quoting WILLIAM E.
KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.02, at
3–4 (4th ed. 1988)).
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A similar process of redefinition is required in the nonprofit
sector. Nonprofits have boards that clearly cannot and do not
manage the nonprofit. But they are there and can be tasked with
some key functions, one of which is to monitor the top
management. At the very least, one should expect that university
boards will have audit committees that perform on par with
those of for-profit boards, with the same access to information,
experts, and advice.
Geoff Hazard has spent his career thinking about the role of
lawyers. He has done so with a characteristic style: grounded in
institutional reality, no-nonsense, appropriately cynical, and
occasionally aspirational. It is this set of qualities that are
needed to understand the role of the lawyer in nonprofit
organizations.

